The authors examine risk pooling arrangements with moral hazard. Because of the nature of the risk pooling arrangement, full nominal coverage is shown to be optimal, despite the presence of moral hazard, and positive loss-prevention effort levels are induced even at full nominal coverage. When marginal utility is convex and higher-order utility effects are sufficiently small, as the number of members in the pool increases, the effort levels of members decrease and, as the pool size approaches infinity, effort levels approach zero. The latter result suggests that moral hazard may define an optimal size for risk pooling arrangements.
INTRODUCTION
The liability insurance crisis of the mid-1980s was characterized by extremely limited insurance availability and dramatic increases in insurance premiums. In response, there was rapid growth in alternative risk financing mechanisms such as group captive insurance companies, reciprocals, assessment mutuals, risk retention groups, and other industry pools. Tillinghast's 1993 Captive Insurance Company Directory listed 3,150 captives, up 1,381 or 78 percent from 1986. Textbook explanations offered by Vaughn (1997, pp. 340-344) and Skipper (1998, pp. 663-667) for captive formation include income-tax advantages, reduced expense ratios, improved cash flow through premium financing, profit enhancement through investment income opportunities and/or financing of external risks, and reduction of the costs of adverse selection (through signalling type to the reinsurance market) and moral hazard (through improved loss-control incentives). The empirical results of Cross, Davidson, and Thornton (1988) confirm the importance of tax advantages to single-owner captive formation. Diallo and Kim (1989) find that the value of parent stock is unchanged around the date of captive formation and interpret this as consistent with asymmetric information related explanations of captive formation. Scordis and Porat (1998) find that free cash flow and volatility of free cash flow are positively related and investment opportunities negatively related to the probability of operating a singleparent captive. They suggest that this is consistent with captive formation being a form of manager perquisite consumption. Schmit and Roth (1990) find that firms with captives have a higher cost of risk and conclude this is also consistent with captive formation as a managerial perquisite. Schmit and Roth suggest that this result may be a product of their sample, in which most firms used single-parent captives. Thus, the empirical literature suggesting tax considerations or perquisite consumption as an explanation of captive formation has focused either exclusively on single-parent captives or made no distinction between single-parent captives and group captives. This study focuses on group captives and their cousins (assessment reciprocals, assessment mutuals, risk retention groups, and industry pools) and how these mechanisms may help in dealing with moral hazard.
A common element of each of the risk-sharing arrangements mentioned above is that the organizations are effectively owned by their policyholders. That is, the policyholders share their risk exposures through the organization but retain exposure to the risk of the pool through their equity positions. As Ligon and Thistle (2000) show, many of these risk pools are quite small, suggesting that the risk retained through the ownership interest in the pool may be significant. Standard insurance companies use the law of large numbers to dissipate unsystematic risk. If risk pools are small, then unsystematic risk may not be fully diversified away in such pools. Also, capital market theory suggests that the optimal portfolio holding is a value weighted portfolio of all risky assets. Stock insurance companies can spread systematic risk over all investors in the capital market, thus spreading systematic risk in accordance with capital market theory. A risk pool can spread the systematic risk of the pool only across its membership, and thus the pool involves a suboptional sharing of systematic risk. Consequently, there must be some advantage offered by the risk pooling arrangements to offset their inferior risk-sharing capacity in order for them to be viable institutions. This study considers the role of risk pooling arrangements in controlling problems of moral hazard.
Moral hazard refers to a problem of asymmetric information in which the actions of one or more parties affect the outcome of a particular economic situation and the actions are not verifiable by other members of the economy. In an insurance context, moral hazard refers to a reduced incentive for loss prevention or loss reduction by insured individuals (Pauly, 1968) . When monitoring is impractical, the optimal market response to moral hazard is generally partial insurance coverage (Shavell, 1979) .
A principal focus of this analysis is the role of size in a risk pool with moral hazard. While it may be quite intuitive that an increase in the number of pool members would tend to decrease the loss-prevention effort levels of the members, verifying this intuition is not trivial. The results here on the effect of pool size on effort suggest that moral hazard may place constraints on the optimal size of such pools. This size constraint serves much the same role as does partial coverage in the Shavell model. Although the model is designed to explore the implications of an empirically observed institution in insurance markets, it extends by analogy to any economic situation in which risk-averse teams exert unobservable efforts that contribute discretely as substitutes toward a joint product (e.g., Holmstrom, 1982) . Thus, the results here also have implications for optimal team size.
In the next section, the basic model appears. Then the noncooperative solution and the role of pool size are considered. Then numerical examples illustrating the effect of pool size on effort and utility are presented. A final section concludes.
AN N-MEMBER LOSS PREVENTION MODEL
All individuals in the pool are assumed to be identical, and this is assumed to be common knowledge. They have initial wealth w 0 and face a positive probability of a loss of fixed size L. The loss probability, p(x i ), i = 1, 2, . . .n, is a function of member i's level of nonnegative effort, x i , on a loss prevention activity. Each member's utility is represented by a strictly increasing von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, u(w), differentiable at least three times, with ()0, ()0 uwuw >< ′′′ , and
The latter condition, which suggests that marginal utility is convex, is less restrictive than the common assumption of nonincreasing absolute risk aversion (Kimball, 1993 If effort is an investment in money terms, its cost should be subtracted from wealth in each state of the world, as in Ehrlich and Becker (1972) . Such a formulation would undoubtedly produce drastically different results.
The next section shows that, in a noncooperative setting with moral hazard, the optimal choice of q implies full coverage (i.e., q = 1) and that at q = 1 members exercise positive effort levels.
THE NONCOOPERATIVE SOLUTION
To model this double moral hazard problem, consider the two-stage game played by the members of the risk pool. In the first stage, n members choose q cooperatively. For the arbitrary level of q selected, each member's effort levels, , in xx … , are chosen noncooperatively in the second stage. When choosing the level of effort, each member has Cournot conjectures about the actions of the other members. Since it is common knowledge that all pool members are identical, each of the members assumes that the other members' effort levels are identical and fixed at x. Then, member number 1 will maximize expected utility by choosing an effort level, x 1 , on loss prevention activities. The expected utility of member 1 is: 
where
is the binomial probability of k successes in n -1 trials with probability p(x) per trial with x a fixed effort level. The rational choice of the level of loss prevention activities of member 1,
, is given by the solution of the following first-order condition:
The optimal choice of coverage is given in Proposition 1, which follows.
Proof: By differentiating Equation (2) with respect to q, we get 
Because all members are identical, in a Nash symmetrical equilibrium, all members choose the same level of effort on loss prevention activities, i.e., x 1 = x. Recognizing that the left side equals zero at k = n -1 and the right side equals zero at k = 0 and implementing a change of index with respect to the binomial probability on the left side, the preceding equation can be rewritten as , . Q.E.D.
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At first glance, this result may seem contrary to the existing literature, which suggests a risk-averse individual chooses partial insurance as his or her utility-maximizing coverage when the moral hazard problem is recognized by the insurer (e.g., Shavell, 1979) . However, the risk pool provides partial effective insurance, even with full stated coverage, since pool members share their losses with each other and retain a share of their own loss equal to L/n. Thus, members in a pool face an effective deductible of L/n if they have a loss, even with full stated coverage. The result regarding full stated coverage may also be interpreted in another way. Because each member is assessed at the end of one period, the sum of the initial premium and the assessment amount represents an actuarially fair premium if each member has the same probability of loss, i.e., the same effort level. Therefore, given symmetry, ( ) Nn q is always equal to 1.
In a traditional insurance model with moral hazard, under full insurance, an individual always chooses a zero effort level, because the marginal utility benefit of effort is always zero. However, in the case of a risk pool, it will be different because, as a result of the equity position in the pool, a perfect risk transfer between members does not occur. This gives us the following result.
Proposition 2: Given 1,0,1,2,,
Proof: Given q = 1, Equation (3) can be rewritten as 
For any 0 x ≥ , the left side of Equation (6) 
THE EFFECT OF CHANGING POOL SIZE
Now consider the response of a member's effort level when the number of members in a risk pool increases. Since each member's risk is diversified through an increase in the number of members, a decrease in an effort level of loss prevention activities is intuitively appealing. First it is demonstrated that for all risk-averse agents, effort falls when pool size is increased from one to two. The result does not hold for all risk-averse decision makers for pool sizes larger than two, but it is shown that when the utility function alternates in sign, with positive odd and negative even derivatives, and higher-order utility effects are sufficiently small, it can be proved that effort falls as pool size grows for any arbitrary n. In the following section, numerical examples are presented that indicate that the results of Proposition 4 and Corollary 1 hold for commonly employed utility specifications.
Proposition 3: For all nonsatiated risk-averse decision makers, effort falls as pool size is increased from one to two.
Proof: The first-order condition for effort at the optimal coverage level q = 1 is given by Equation (6).
For n = 1 this becomes
For n = 2 this becomes ( ) , the terms in brackets in both Equations (7) and (8) are negative. However, the bracketed term in Equation (8) clearly has a smaller absolute value. This implies that the disutility of effort has a smaller absolute value and, hence, that effort falls. Q.E.D.
When n exceeds two, more structure is required. The result requires that higher-order utility effects be sufficiently small. The analysis proceeds in two stages. First it is shown that when u [4] , the fourth derivative of the utility function, and higher derivatives equal zero, the result continues to hold. Then a corollary shows that if the utility function alternates in sign and is differentiable a sufficiently large number of times, the result continues to hold.
Proposition 4: Ignoring higher-order utility effects (i.e., u [4] and higher derivatives equal zero), if the number of members in a risk pool with moral hazard increases,
for any probability of a loss.
Proof: Given q = 1, the optimal choice of the level of loss prevention activities of a member,
, is given by the solution of the following problem: 
.
Let l 1 and 0 l be random variables denoting expected out-of-pocket money when member 1 has a loss or no loss, respectively. Then, with n members in a risk pool, where i j l is the ith moment of l j (omitting i = 1 for notational convenience) we have uwl − about w 0 with a Lagrange form of the remainder, Equation (9) can be rewritten as In the general case, evaluating Equation (11) requires determining how q changes as expected wealth levels change. 3 However, if [4] 0 u = , then u′′′ is invariant as the expected wealth level changes, and hence the behavior of q becomes irrelevant, and 10 nn www == . Equation (11) can then be rewritten as The behavior of the Lagrange form of the remainder is discussed in the Appendix. 
If the left side of Equation (13) is greater than that of Equation (14) Proposition 4 shows that in the absence of higher-order utility effects, effort falls with pool size. The following corollary confirms the result inductively in a slightly more general framework. The assumption of alternating signs for the derivatives of the utility function used in the corollary holds for most commonly employed utility functions.
Corollary 1:
If the utility function alternates in sign with positive odd and negative even derivatives and is differentiable a sufficiently large number of times, and if the number of members in a risk pool with moral hazard increases,
Proof:
Consider an m-term Taylor series expansion of 0 ( ) uwl − ) about w 0 with a Lagrange form of the remainder. Note, the m-term analog of Equation (11) 
If Equation (18) = Equation (19), optimal effort is unchanged as pool size increases from n to n + 1. If Equation (18) > Equation (19), effort must fall to reach its optimal level as pool size increases from n to n + 1. If Equation (18) < Equation (19), effort must rise to reach its optimal level as pool size increases from n to n + 1. Assume initially that effort is unchanged.
Note that the kth moment for the no-loss state has the form [ (/)]
k EYLn , where Y is a binomial random variable with a per trial probability of success (i.e., a loss) p(x 1 ) and n -1 trials, while the kth moment for the loss state has the form ( )( ) These results confirm the intuition that as the number of members in a risk pool increases, the effort levels of the members decrease. When a risk is more diversified over more members, the incentives to avoid or mitigate losses are compromised by an increase in the number of members. The following corollary is straightforward.
Corollary 2:
If the utility function alternates in sign with positive odd and negative even derivatives, and higher-order utility effects are sufficiently small, if the number of members goes to infinity, with moral hazard,
∞ approaches zero.
Proof:
Consider an m-term Taylor series expansion. The optimal level of effort,
, satisfies the first-order condition: ... With n approaching infinity, effective coverage under the risk pool approaches full insurance and the absolute value of 0 ()() j j nnl ElEl − approaches zero for each moment j. For m sufficiently large the remainder term R m also approaches zero. Hence, as n goes to infinity with m large, the left side of Equation (20) approaches zero. That is, the marginal utility benefit of effort tends to zero. Therefore, Equation (20) As these results show, the intuition that effort falls as pool size grows is not trivially verified. The results of Proposition 4 and its corollaries show that if higher-order aspects of utility are sufficiently small, this intuitive result can be verified.
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The analytical difficulties that arise in this problem are similar in nature to those that arise in the case of determining optimal coverage when a single individual adds additional similar risks, which was considered by Eeckhoudt et al. (1991) . In the next section, examples are presented that suggest that, for plausible specifications of p(x) and v(x) and commonly used utility functions exhibiting derivatives that alternate in sign, effort is a decreasing function of pool size. 4 Proposition 4 and its corollaries obviously hold for quadratic utility because in that case
If effort does fall with pool size, it suggests that moral hazard may define an optimal size for a risk pooling arrangement. The results here show that, ignoring the higherorder terms of the utility function and holding effort constant, marginal utility is higher with n members than with n + 1 members. For optimization, the marginal benefit of effort must equal its marginal cost. Thus, effort levels must fall with increasing pool size. This produces three separate effects on expected utility. First, increasing pool size increases risk sharing, which unambiguously increases pool members' utility. Second, decreased effort decreases the disutility of effort, which also increases pool members' utility. In spite of this, the moral hazard problem has ambiguous effects. This is true because decreased effort also increases the probability of loss, which decreases the utility of pool membership. The marginal utility benefits of a larger pool are likely a decreasing convex function of pool size. One-half the risk is retained in a two-member pool, one-third in a three-member pool, and so on, suggesting additional risk-sharing benefits decline convexly in pool size. Because effort decreases in pool size and 0, 0 vv >> ′′′ , the change in disutility of effort is greatest when effort is high (i.e., pool size is small). Also, the marginal utility costs of increasing loss probability are an increasing concave function of pool size, because ()0 px< ′ and ()0 px> ′′ . While it is possible the marginal benefit of adding members remains greater than the marginal cost over all finite pool sizes, it is also possible that there may exist a finite optimal size where these marginal benefits and costs are equalized. Such a result is similar in spirit to that suggested by Shavell (1979) , where moral hazard leads to partial insurance coverage, even at actuarially fair prices. Here, smaller pool size is equivalent to greater risk retention. In the examples shown in the following section, this intuition is found often, but not always verified.
SIMULATED RISK POOLS
In this section, the possibility that decreases in effort levels resulting from increases in pool size lead the optimal size of a risk pool to be finite is explored. The results show that this is often but not always the case. Examples are generated using the following specifications for the productivity of effort, The results are presented in Table 1 . Results are presented for pool sizes of 10, 50, 100, 150, and infinity.
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The latter utility function is a mixture of exponentials. Such functions display desirable comparative statics properties (Caballé and Pomansky, 1996; Pratt and Zeckhauser, 1987) . Among these is decreasing absolute risk aversion. For each of the specifications of utility and for both loss sizes, the optimal effort level is decreasing in pool size, consistent with the results of Proposition 4 and Corollary 1.
Although not reported in Table 1 , this also holds as l goes to 1.
An optimal finite pool size is also a common result. For the small loss sizes an optimal finite size is suggested for all utility functions when 0.5 l = . In the cases of exponential utility and mixed exponential utility, however, as l goes to 1 (not reported) pool utility is essentially constant over pool sizes 50 to 150 and is smaller than for an infinitely sized pool. In the other cases, the optimal size is finite and utility dependent. For 0.5 () uww = and for logarithmic utility, optimal pool size is also in the 50 to 100 member range. For 0.9 () uww = optimal pool size is greater than 150 but still finite. Thus, counterintuitively, a decrease in risk aversion (w 0.9 represents a less risk-averse utility function than w 0.5 ) increases the optimal pool size. In the case of these two utility functions, increasing loss size increases the optimal pool size, consistent with intuition (the risk-sharing benefit of larger pools should be greater the larger the risk). In the case of logarithmic utility, the optimal pool size is roughly unchanged when the loss size increases, being slightly above 50 in each case. In the case of exponential utility and the exponential mixture, an optimal size between 50 and 100 exists for the large loss size.
The examples confirm the results of Proposition 4 and Corollary 1. Effort falls as pool size increases, irrespective of the utility function, the size of the loss relative to initial wealth, or the importance of moral hazard to the loss probability. The suggestion of finite pool size appears less robust, since the simulations do not verify this in the case of exponential or mixed exponential utility if the loss is small in relation to total wealth and l approaches 1. However, finite pool sizes are optimal in all the other specifications, although in some cases these finite pools may be relatively large.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Because of their equity stake in the pool, pool participants face different loss prevention incentives than purchasers of standard insurance contracts with equivalent expected benefits and premiums. These different loss prevention incentives offer one explanation of why relatively small risk pools are viable institutions. The results show that risk pools optimally involve full stated insurance coverage and that a Nash symmetric equilibrium exists regarding the optimal level of effort on loss prevention activities, which is positive for any levels of effort by other members. Furthermore, the results show that with moral hazard, if higher-order utility effects are sufficiently small, the members of a risk pool always decrease their optimal levels of effort on loss prevention activities as the number of members increases and the optimal level of effort approaches zero as the number of members becomes large enough. Effort decreasing in pool size suggests that moral hazard may create an optimal size level of risk pooling arrangements. If the pool grows too large, the costs imposed by the moral hazard may outweigh the benefits of increased risk sharing. The examples presented suggest that effort does fall with pool size for commonly used utility functions and that, with the exception of a certain loss in the absence of effort and exponential or mixed exponential utility where losses are small relative to initial wealth, a finite pool size is optimal.
APPENDIX
In this appendix, specifics regarding the behavior of the Lagrange form of the remainder for a Taylor series are presented. First it is established that if the first four derivatives of the utility function alternate in sign (with 0, 0, 0, and 0) uuuu ><>< ′′′′′′′′′′ and the perturbation to wealth is negative, as it is with insurable losses, then the Lagrange
